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I. INTRODUCTION
“Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives man
indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice and
unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more abundant
freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn
against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their
instrumentality.”1
“[M]arket societies must construct elaborate rules and institutional
structures to limit the individual pursuit of gain or risk degenerating into a
1. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 268 (2d ed. 2001).

AND

2013]

GERMANY’S SUPPORT OF ASSAD

1359

Hobbesian war of all against all . . . They must also act to channel the
energies of those economic actors motivated largely by gain into a narrow
range of legitimate activities. In summary, the economy has to be
embedded in law, politics, and morality.”2

The availability of liberation technologies, or information and
communication technologies utilized by individuals seeking greater
freedoms and rights, has changed the nature of modern
democratization movements by facilitating pro-democracy and antidemocracy efforts alike.3 The revolutionary potential of social media
has been well documented, as it has played an important role in
helping to unseat authoritarian leaders throughout the Arab Spring.4
However, these technologies can also provide the state with
advanced surveillance capabilities and help governments crush
democratic movements before they can get off the ground.5
The extent to which dictators employ repressive surveillance
techniques varies widely.6 While obtaining reliable news from many
of these war-torn states is a challenge, press reports indicate that
dictators such as Bashar al-Assad have used intrusive surveillance
2. Fred Block & Karl Polanyi, Karl Polanyi and the Writing of “The Great
Transformation”, 32 THEORY & SOC’Y 275, 297 (2003).
3. See Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Liberation vs. Control: The
Future of Cyberspace, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 43, 44 (2010) (alluding to the ability of
dictatorships to use liberation technologies to invade the privacy of its citizens by
tracking and tracing digital information to specific people); Larry Diamond,
Liberation Technology, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70 (2010) (“Liberation technology
is any form of information and communication technology (ICT) that can expand
political, social, and economic freedom.”).
4. See, e.g., Tanja Aitamurto, How Social Media Is Keeping the Egyptian
Revolution Alive, PBS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/09/
how-social-media-is-keeping-the-egyptian-revolution-alive256.html (highlighting
the ongoing use of Twitter and Facebook for pro-democracy activism in PostMubarak Egypt); Justin Bomberowitz, The Libyan Revolution Through Social
Media, BOSTINNO, (Aug. 22, 2011), http://bostinno.com/2011/08/22/the-libyanrevolution-through-social-media/ (describing the importance of Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube, and blogs in the Libyan revolution).
5. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 3, at 71 (comparing authoritarian violence
accomplished through the Internet to 19th century violence committed through the
use of the telegraph).
6. See generally The Technology Helping Repressive Regimes Spy, NPR (Dec.
14, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/14/143639670/the-technology-helpingrepressive-regimes-spy (discussing the variety of surveillance techniques
employed in the Middle East, including text message analysis systems, email and
cellphone surveillance, and the monitoring of internet traffic).
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tools to track individuals’ movements, access electronic files, and
even detain and torture members of the opposition.7 Unfortunately,
stories of detention and torture, aided by cutting-edge Western
surveillance technology, are not uncommon.8 Many dictators cannot
maintain effective surveillance without these Western companies,
such as Trovicor GmbH (Trovicor), which provides both
technological infrastructure and maintenance services.9 Not only
does this type of surveillance allow egregious rights violations to go
unfettered, it also prolongs bloody conflicts in transitioning states
like Syria.10
This comment makes a case for state liability for extraterritorial
human rights abuses committed by corporations under the framework
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and explains
that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has already laid
the foundation to find such a violation. Part II will discuss the current
status of the ECHR. It will also explain the jurisdictional requirement
laid out in Article 1 of the ECHR and describe when the ECtHR has

7. See Monitoring the Opposition: Siemens Allegedly Sold Surveillance Gear
to Syria, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
business/ard-reports-siemens-sold-surveillance-technology-to-syria-a-826860.html
[hereinafter Monitoring the Opposition] (describing the Syrian regime’s
suppression of the opposition through use of surveillance technology, provided by
the German company Trovicor, that is capable of tracking a speaker’s location and
identity).
8. See, e.g., Meg Roggensack & Betsy Walters, Excuses, Excuses:
Surveillance Technology and Oppressive Regimes, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/11/18/excuses-excusessurveillance-technology-and-oppressive-regimes/ (providing examples of detention
and torture made possible by Western surveillance technologies in states like Iran,
Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen).
9. See generally EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF
INTERNET FREEDOM 178 (2012) (detailing Western companies’ disregard for
engaging in proactive measures to limit the human rights abuses that occur through
the use of their surveillance technologies).
10. See Roggensack & Walters, supra note 8 (mentioning that Syria does not
have laws to limit the Government’s ability to use surveillance technologies,
allowing these technologies to prop up the repressive regime); cf. Ellen
Nakashima, Iran Aids Syria in Tracking Opposition via Electronic Surveillance,
U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2012-10-09/world/35500619_1_surveillance-software-syrians-president-bashar
(describing how Syria has used surveillance strategies learned from Iran to track
rebel groups via social media and send Syrian forces to identified areas to hamper
opposition efforts).
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asserted its authority outside of the traditional confines of the
Council of Europe. Furthermore, it will describe how different cases
have dealt with the positive obligations of states under Article 8,
which codifies a right to privacy, and when these obligations have
been enforced.
Part III will argue that the ECHR provides the ECtHR jurisdiction
over the extraterritorial effects of a corporation’s actions through the
state agent theory. And, importantly, it will argue that Germany
violated its positive obligation to respect the rights in Article 8 of the
ECHR by failing to regulate the German company Trovicor GmbH
(Trovicor) after it facilitated the creation of a Syrian surveillance
state.
Part IV recommends that a more stringent and binding version of
the Global Network Initiative be created in order to hold companies
responsible for failing to uphold clear standards of corporate social
responsibility. It also recommends that Germany adopt more
stringent dual-use export control regulations in order to prevent its
companies from exporting their technology to repressive regimes that
use the technology to commit human rights violations. Additionally,
it suggests that the exceptions to the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) be
expanded to include violations of human rights, so that when states
like Germany impose stricter regulations on exports, they will not
violate their WTO duties. Lastly, Part V concludes that Germany can
be held liable under the ECHR for the actions of Trovicor and that
the ECtHR should clarify its international precedent on the liability
of a member state for extraterritorial human rights violations by
companies.

II. BACKGROUND
On September 3, 1953, the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), drafted by the Council of Europe, entered into
force.11 The Council of Europe drafted the ECHR in response to the
human rights violations of the Second World War.12 With memories
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
12. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE xxi, xxii–xxiii (2000) (recounting the evolution of
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of the Holocaust fresh in the minds of the Council, the drafters of the
ECHR questioned traditional notions of sovereignty and sought to
curb the power of states by adopting strong substantive protections of
rights and granting broad jurisdiction to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), the judicial body that hears complaints
under the ECHR.13 Like most human rights conventions, the ECHR
not only requires states to refrain from committing violations, but
also imposes positive obligations requiring a state to take affirmative
steps to protect and promote the rights codified in the ECHR.14
In fact, many have praised the European system for achieving the
most effective protection of human rights, as compared to the
protection provided by other regional systems of human rights.15
Despite the ECHR’s effectiveness, however, concerns of a
governance gap, caused by globalization and the inability to control
corporate activities, remain.16 Minimizing governance gaps is an
extremely important task for human rights advocates because these
gaps pose some of the most serious risks to human rights.17
international human rights after the Nuremberg trials and explaining how
instruments like the European Convention were the first major regional response).
13. See generally id. (discussing the historical basis for the creation and
development of case law for the European Court of Human Rights).
14. See Tawhida Ahmed & Israel de Jesus Butler, The European Union and
Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 771, 771–75
(2006) (providing that the European Union (EU) member states may be bound by
customary international law to protect certain human rights, thereby challenging
traditional notions of community and sovereignty by subjecting those states to
positive obligations and providing a place for international law to help guide
domestic decision-making).
15. See Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the Gap?: The Role of Regional and
National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y
J. 174, 184–86 (2011) (highlighting that the ECHR not only has placed strict
responsibilities on states that are party to the Convention, but also has served as a
model internationally for the promotion of various human rights, including the
right to a private life).
16. See EUROPEAN COALITION FOR CORPORATE JUSTICE & AMNESTY INT’L,
GREEN PAPER ON THE REVIEW OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 44/2001 ON
JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS 3 (2009) [hereinafter ECCJ & AI], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society
_ngo_academics_others/amnesty_international_and_european_coalition_for_corpo
rate_justice_en.pdf (defining governance gaps as failures in legal mechanisms to
deter human rights abuses from occurring through the creation of liability for
entities such as corporations).
17. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2010: A GLOBAL RISK
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A. ARTICLE 1 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Article 1 of the ECHR states that contracting parties to the
ECHR—states that comprise the Council of Europe—are responsible
for guaranteeing the rights defined by the ECHR to any person
within the jurisdiction of the respective states.18 The term “within
their jurisdiction” has been the subject of much jurisprudential
interpretation as applicants have advocated for an expansion of the
ECHR’s protection beyond the territorial confines of the member
states.19 A major impetus for these new interpretations is the
ECtHR’s willingness to move away from the “ultimate control and
authority test” to determine jurisdiction towards the much laxer
“effective authority and control test,” which has resulted in more
findings of jurisdiction.20 Thus, the concept of jurisdiction has
expanded substantially, making way for the Court to apply an
extraterritorial interpretation.21
NETWORK REPORT 8 (2010), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2010.pdf (indicating that governance gaps are so
uniquely dangerous because the growing interconnectedness of our globalized
world provides more space for gaps to appear).
18. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section I of this Convention.”).
19. See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human
Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
227, 238-51 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (documenting the ECtHR’s cases that have
interpreted Article 1 of the Convention, and noting that the European Commission
of Human Rights has stipulated that “within their jurisdiction” can apply to agents
of the State including diplomatic or consular agents, the military, and persons or
property over which these actors exercise authority).
20. See Laura Henderson, Note, With (Great) Power Comes (Great)
Responsibility: A Move Toward Greater Responsibility for States Exercising
Power Abroad, 28 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 50, 54 (2012) (observing that the
Court in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom moved away from the ultimate authority and
control test, thereby allowing more responsibility to be attributed to the
extraterritorial actions of member states by accepting a lower threshold for
control).
21. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep.
18 ¶¶ 149–50 (2011) (finding that the actions of United Kingdom (UK) troops in
Basra, Iraq, fell within the UK’s jurisdiction for purposes of Article 1 of the
ECHR); see also Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights
Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 262, 294-95,
300 (2008) (describing the basis for civil and criminal accountability for the
extraterritorial actions of corporations in the European context as a means to
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Initially, in Bankovic v. Belgium (2001), the ECtHR limited the
scope of Article 1 by using a fact-specific inquiry to analyze
extraterritorial positive obligations, and by holding that, for a
positive obligation to exist, the foreign state in question should have
existed previously under the territorial confines of the ECHR.22 The
Bankovic Court, therefore, appeared to seriously diminish the
possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction.23 After this decision, the
international community generally understood that Article 1 of the
ECHR was essentially or primarily territorial in its application, only
circumventable in exceptional circumstances.24
The ECtHR has recently reversed this trend, however, and
affirmed a broader interpretation of Article 1 jurisdiction.25 In AlSkeini v. the United Kingdom (2011), the Court formally listed the
exceptions to the “essentially territorial” application of Article 1,
when it held the United Kingdom responsible for the actions of its
troops in Iraq.26 First, the spatial model allows for jurisdiction when a
Convention state exercises effective control, through initiating
military action, over an area.27 Second, the personal model allows for
jurisdiction through the actions taken abroad by an agent of a state
that is a party to the ECHR.28 This can include the actions of a
ensure that corporations pay a penalty for violating human rights and victims
receive reparations).
22. See Alexandra Ruth & Mirja Trilsch, International Decision: Bankovic v.
Belgium (Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 168, 170–72 (2003) (describing how
the ECtHR seemed to narrow the holdings in Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v.
Turkey when it found that NATO bombings in Kosovo were not within the
jurisdiction of Article 1).
23. See id. at 172 (highlighting that the Bankovic decision marked a drastic
switch from the Court’s previous decisions which seemed to expand the notion of
jurisdiction beyond mere territoriality).
24. See Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 ¶ 80 (establishing
jurisdiction “only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific
circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention”).
25. See Paolo Ronchi, Al-Skeini v. UK: The Borders of Human Rights, L.Q.
REV. (forthcoming) (explaining the recent expansion of the territorial notions in
Article 1, but also conveying the lack of clarity provided by the Court on this
issue).
26. See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶¶ 149–50 (utilizing a hybrid test to
hold that the United Kingdom was responsible for the actions of its troops abroad
because the UK exercised effective control over Iraq as an occupying power and
its troops fulfilled the public power function by providing a security role).
27. Id. ¶ 138; Ronchi, supra note 25, at 3.
28. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶¶ 133–36; see Cedric Ryngaert, Clarifying
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diplomatic or consular agent in a foreign territory, any agent that
exercises an executive or judicial public power function in a foreign
territory, or a state agent that takes custody of an individual in a
foreign territory.29 As a result, the ECHR has gradually extended its
territorial scope, opening the door for more cases to be brought
before the ECtHR to test the limits of the formal exceptions to
territorial jurisdiction.30

B. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
Article 8 of the ECHR is widely recognized as establishing an
individual’s right to a private life.31 As compared to other
international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ECHR places a higher burden
upon member states by requiring them to respect the right to
privacy.32
The ECHR, of which Germany is a party, provides a robust basis
for imposing a positive obligation on states to protect an individual’s

the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 28
UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 57, 60 (2011) (identifying the personal model of
jurisdiction and the lack of explanation provided by the ECtHR on its meaning).
29. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶¶ 134–36; cf. Ryngaert, supra note 26, at
60 (suggesting that positive obligations can and should extend through state agents
because states need to be deterred from engaging in irresponsible behavior beyond
their borders).
30. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, The Long Arm of the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Recent Development of Issa v. Turkey, 12 AM. U. HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 9, 11 (highlighting Russia as a likely candidate to be brought before the
ECtHR for extraterritorial violations); Ronchi, supra note 25, at 4 (indicating that
the Court has failed to elaborate on the State agent exception despite the potential
importance of the exception).
31. Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in
Human Rights Treaties, 6 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 247, 248 (1998).
32. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(1) (“Everyone has the right to respect for
his private . . . life.”); ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (2004) (explaining that members of the
European Convention on Human Rights must take positive actions to prevent
violations of the convention even when a violation occurs between two private
parties); id. at 250–59 (comparing the ICCPR’s text to that of the ECHR and
noting that while the ECHR has broad protections it has not fully developed its
data protection laws).
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right to privacy.33 Although a negative obligation exists when a third
party acts on behalf of a state, the ECHR also imposes a positive
obligation when a third party acts independent of the state.34 This
authority derives from the requirement of states to respect the right to
privacy and allows the ECtHR to hold a state liable for failing to take
reasonable measures to prevent a third party from violating the rights
codified in the ECHR.35 As seen in Fadeyeva v. Russia (2005), the
Court has most thoroughly developed the concept of positive
obligations to control the actions of corporate entities in the case of
environmental polluters, finding that governments have the
responsibility to prevent corporations from diminishing an
individual’s right to enjoy his or her private life when private

33. Germany, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/country/germany (last
visited Apr. 5, 2013) (noting that Germany ratified the ECHR on December 5,
1952; see MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 1–3 (contextualizing the development of
positive obligations in the European Court and recapping some of the earliest
discussions of them). Compare ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(2) (prohibiting
violations of the right to privacy except “in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others”), with U.N. Human Rights Commission,
CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to
Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of
Honour and Reputation (Art. 17), ¶¶ 3–4 (Aug. 4, 1988), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/23378a8724595410c12563ed004aee
cd?Opendocument (explaining that violations of the right to privacy, include
arbitrary or unlawful searches, which are unreasonable given the circumstances,
such as when public authorities fail to justify the data mining of personal
information of an individual).
34. See DANIEL AUGENSTEIN, STATE RESPONSIBILITIES TO REGULATE AND
ADJUDICATE CORPORATE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2011) (delineating between negative obligations, which enforce
non-interference with rights by a state, and positive obligations, which require a
state to respect and actively prevent third parties, like corporations, from violating
the rights created by the ECHR).
35. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(1) (stating that everyone has the right to
respect of their private life); STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 215 (2006)
(discussing the proactive requirement that states take reasonable positive measures
to prevent violations of the Convention from taking place before they occur, even
when committed by private parties); MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 186, 225
(summarizing the extra requirements placed on a state through positive obligations,
including the duty of states to protect individuals from having their rights in the
ECHR violated by private persons).
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corporations cause severe deterioration of the natural environment.36
In these circumstances, the ECtHR has found a positive obligation
is established when a sufficient nexus exists between the harm
caused and the state.37 The ECtHR often accounts for deference
provided to the judgment of the state, also known as the state’s
margin of appreciation, by looking to whether the state has taken
effective and reasonable measures to prevent prohibited behavior.38
The ECtHR has held, however, that a state’s knowledge of the
frequent violation of human rights, coupled with the state’s failure to
act reasonably, can severely diminish the margin of appreciation
afforded to the state.39 Then, as offered in Fadeyeva, the ECtHR
provides an extensive analysis using the so-called fair balance test,
weighing the rights of an individual against the interests of society to
determine whether a state fulfills its positive obligation.40 Thus, the
36. See Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 92 (holding Russia
accountable for the pollution emanating from a steel plant); Guerra v. Italy, App.
No. 14967/89, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210 ¶¶ 56–60 (placing a positive obligation on
Italy to prevent pollution from a factory); López-Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 58 (1994) (affirming that Spain had a duty to prevent pollution
from a waste treatment plant).
37. See Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 92 (determining that a
sufficient nexus existed between Russia and the steel plant’s pollution which
prevented citizens from enjoying their private lives).
38. See Janneke Gerards, Pluralism, Deference, and the Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine, 17 EUR. L.J. 80, 85-87 (2010) (comparing the margin of
appreciation doctrine to deferential judicial review and recognizing the strong
similarity between the two). See generally Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the
European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of
Appreciation?, 3 U.C. LONDON HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 2–5 (2010) (tracing the
introduction and development of the margin of appreciation doctrine within the
ECtHR and underscoring its wide applicability today).
39. Compare X & Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 24–27 (1985)
(determining that the Netherlands was not afforded a margin of appreciation for
failing to criminalize certain illegal acts that violated the right to private life), with
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49 (1976) (providing
the first application of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the ECtHR when it
determined that the United Kingdom’s restrictions on speech were reasonable
because they served the Council of Europe’s goal of promoting a democratic
society).
40. Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 94; see MOWBRAY, supra note 32,
at 186 (detailing the use of the fair balance test in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence). But
see ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(2) (identifying the legitimate interests of society
for which an Article 8 right can be interfered with, such as national security, public
safety, economic well-being, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health
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ECtHR has afforded great protection to the rights established in the
ECHR, such as the right to a private life, by both imposing positive
obligations on states and scrutinizing the validity of each state’s
actions.41

III. ANALYSIS
Unlike other authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, Bashar alAssad has promoted the use of social media in Syria to help a group
of pro-Assad hackers intercept communications and track the
movements of the Syrian opposition.42 While these pro-government
hackers are arguably drivers for many human rights violations in
Syria, Germany’s complicity in Syria’s spying tactics violates the
ECHR’s guarantee of privacy, even though Syria is outside of the
territorial confines of the Council of Europe.43 Moreover, the severity
with which Syria is violating the right to privacy and its utter
disregard for its international obligations helps contextualize the
second part of this analysis, i.e., Germany’s responsibility for
Trovicor’s actions.44

A. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAS JURISDICTION
OVER TROVICOR’S ACTIONS IN SYRIA UNDER THE STATE AGENT
THEORY OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE GERMANY EXERCISES
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER TROVICOR
Through utilization of Trovicor’s technologies, Syria’s
surveillance capabilities extend beyond mere interception of
communications and tracking of citizens’ locations.45 Because
or morals, or for protection of other rights and freedoms).
41. See generally MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 1–5 (portraying the important
role positive obligations have played in European jurisprudence).
42. See Ben Knight, German Spyware Business Supports Dictators, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16249165,00.html
(pointing out Syria’s inclination to use digital weapons against the opposition).
43. See id. (detailing the sale of malware by German companies to Syria, along
with technology that has the ability to “identify political opponents” according to
one of the company’s brochures).
44. See id. (indicating that the spying has been so severe in Syria, that the EU
has realized the increased need to create new export controls for these surveillance
technologies).
45. See Vernon Silver & Ben Elgin, Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine with
Help From Nokia Siemens, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/torture-in-bahrain-becomes-routine-
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Trovicor functions as a state agent of Germany, the ECtHR has
jurisdiction to hear a complaint related to Trovicor’s activities in
Syria.46 These activities constitute violations of Article 8 of the
ECHR both because they arbitrarily interfere with individuals’
private lives and private correspondence, and because they indicate
that Trovicor’s services fulfill a public power function in Syria.47
1. Trovicor Is a State Agent Because Trovicor’s Actions Are
Attributable to Germany
To consider Trovicor a state agent for purposes of ECHR liability,
its actions must be attributable to Germany.48 Attribution is
determined by which state has effective control over the violating
entity, based on factors such as whether there is an explicit, legal
duty upon the state to have some degree of responsibility for the
entity’s actions and whether the entity recognizes that the state has
with-help-from-nokia-siemens-networking.html (explaining that Trovicor allows
states to intercept nearly all forms of digital transmissions, track individuals’
locations through their phones, activate laptop applications without the user’s
knowledge, and even alter the content of digital communications).
46. See Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 81 (ordering that if a
Council of Europe member state has jurisdiction over a private individual, then
that member state has a duty to prevent that individual from violating another
individual’s Convention-protected rights, even while in a foreign area); Company
Overview of Trovicor GmbH, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.
businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=81677726 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2013) (explaining that Trovicor is based in Munich, Germany); see
also Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/31, Annexes 24–25 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights](arguing that the need for a judicial and
non-judicial remedy to the governance issue of controlling the actions of
multinational companies might necessitate such an expansive understanding of
jurisdiction in regional human rights instruments).
47. See, e.g., Christian Fuchs, Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
Internet Surveillance for Society, in THE PRIVACY & SECURITIES – RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES 1, 32 (2012) (putting into perspective the intrusiveness of Trovicor’s
surveillance technologies, like deep packet inspection, which involves a complete
scan of all data and extraction of any relevant information).
48. See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85
(2011) (holding that in the case of unlawful detention in Iraq by British armed
forces, the United Kingdom could be held liable through Article 1 if the violation
of Article 8 could be attributed to the UK).
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authority over it.49 The determining fact for jurisdictional purposes is
whether Germany had the ability to regulate Trovicor at the time that
Trovicor entered Syria.50
Trovicor, as a German-regulated company, is subject to
Germany’s control and authority both while operating in Germany
and in regards to its business practices abroad.51 Trovicor is
headquartered in Munich, Germany, and is a member of BITKOM,
an organization that actively engages in lobbying efforts to change
German policies, indicating that Trovicor recognizes its operations
are subject to German regulation while in Germany.52 Also, given
49. See Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace
Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 509,
522–23 (2008) (discussing the Court’s decision in Behrami, where it found that the
United Nations had ultimate authority and control, a more difficult standard than
what is required today). Compare Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 81
(conveying that when a state has control over a private party and acquiesces to that
party’s violation of ECHR in a foreign territory, then Article 1 jurisdiction can
apply), with id. ¶ 82 (finding that the United Nations’ official policy against
indefinite internment indicated that its attempts to punish the unlawful detention
proved the detention was not attributable to the UN). See generally Anne Peters,
The Applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights in Times of
Complex Jurisdiction and the Principle of Fundamental Rights Tolerance, 48
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 1, 19–41 (2010) (identifying the tension between
state autonomy and the effective promotion of human rights as a central concern
when applying the attribution theory for jurisdictional questions, thus giving rise to
the notion of ultimate control).
50. See Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶¶ 2–6 (Faud, J., partly dissenting)
(noting the importance of the fact in Loizidou v. Turkey that Turkey had control
over the TRNC at the time that the organization entered Turkey to establish Article
1 jurisdiction because Turkey was a significant cause of the Convention being
violated); AUGENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 24 (creating a distinction between ‘direct
extraterritorial jurisdiction’ and ‘domestic measures with extraterritorial
implications’ and stressing that it is easier to find ECHR jurisdiction in the lattertype cases).
51. See SIEMENS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011: CREATING SUSTAINABLE CITIES
29 (2011) [hereinafter SIEMENS ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/en/investor_relations/siemens_ar_2011.pdf
(observing that Siemens AG, of which Trovicor is a subsidiary, is regulated by
numerous pieces of German legislation, including the German Stock Corporation
Act, the German Corporate Governance Code, and the German Codetermination
Act).
52. See About BITKOM, BITKOM, http://www.bitkom.org/en/about_bitkom/
42620.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (outlining the organization’s goals to
promote strategic ICT-Policy within Germany to benefit its member companies);
Trovicor in Brief, TROVICOR, http://trovicor.com/en/company-en.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2013).
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that Trovicor has provided similarly improper surveillance to
Bahrain, Germany could have active knowledge of Trovicor’s
actions, thereby creating an explicit duty for Germany to improve
regulations targeting Trovicor.53 Even though the European Union
(EU) also maintains the ability to create export controls to regulate
companies like Trovicor, the ECtHR has recognized that a state has
effective control if an international organization allows the state to
exercise comparatively more control over an entity.54 In this instance,
Germany specifically regulates the dual-use export market and has
even more restrictive regulations than the EU regarding these items,
demonstrating that Germany exercises comparatively more control
over Trovicor than any other state or international entity.55
While Germany arguably did not hold as much control over
Trovicor when Trovicor began executing its maintenance and service
contracts in Syria, Germany’s control over Trovicor before it entered
Syria sufficiently satisfies the effective control test.56 As previously
established, Trovicor is subject to German regulations.57 The ECtHR
has already determined that if a state is responsible for an entity’s
entry into a foreign territory, the Court has jurisdiction over the state
for failure to uphold a positive obligation by controlling the actions
53. See Kim Zetter, Nokia-Siemens Spy Tools Aid Police Torture in Bahrain,
WIRED (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/nokiasiemens-spy-systems/ (documenting Trovicor’s involvement in twelve Middle
Eastern and North African states and comparing the similarities between
surveillance provided by Trovicor and weapons technologies).
54. Cf. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 83–
86 (2011) (determining that the United Kingdom had effective control over its
troops who had unlawfully detained an individual, sufficient for jurisdiction, even
though the United Nations Security Council authorized the mission in Iraq,
because the ECtHR found that the UK had ultimate control over the troops’
actions).
55. See ISABELLE MAELCAMP, US COMMERCIAL SERV., EU EXPORT CONTROL
ON DUAL USE ITEMS 4 (2010) (acknowledging that Germany places more
restrictive regulations on dual-use exports by supplementing the EU’s list of “most
sensitive items” with its own list, and that this type of national list is expressly
encouraged by Article 4 of the EU Council Regulation 428/2009).
56. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89,310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶ 56 (1996) (affirming the principle that even though Turkey did not exercise
direct control of TRNC forces after they entered northern Cyprus, the fact that
Turkey had effective overall control of those troops was sufficient for a finding of
jurisdiction).
57. See SIEMENS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 25 (detailing which pieces
of German legislation apply to Trovicor).
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of that entity.58 Thus, Germany’s effective authority and control over
Trovicor allows the ECtHR to uphold Germany’s jurisdiction over
Trovicor as a state agent, if Trovicor’s actions meet the public
powers requirements of jurisdiction.
2. Trovicor’s Actions Fulfill the Public Powers Requirement Because
Its Surveillance Technology Acts as a Supplement to Law
Enforcement, a Traditionally Judicial Function
One means by which the state agent jurisdictional exception
applies is when the foreign state allows the agent to operate within its
territory, by granting consent, extending an invitation, or
demonstrating acquiescence.59 Additionally, the agent of a member
state, while operating in a foreign territory, must take on what is
typically considered a public powers role within that territory, which
consists of a major executive or judicial function.60
Trovicor’s contract with Syria fulfills the invitation requirement
under this exception.61 A shroud of secrecy surrounds the situation,
making it difficult to know the exact circumstances; however, reports
indicate that Trovicor has signed a contract with Syria.62 If similar to
58. See, Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 51–54 (distinguishing between
effective control over an area as a grounds for jurisdiction and effective control
over an entity within a foreign jurisdiction as a basis to impute ECHR liability on
the contracting state responsible for that entity’s actions).
59. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶
135 (2011).
60. Id.; Ronchi, supra note 25, at 4-5 (recognizing that the ECtHR has failed to
develop the concept of what constitutes “public powers,” but also mentioning that
the ECtHR found the UK’s security role in Iraq to fulfill the public powers
exception).
61. See German Firm Sold Surveillance Equipment to Syria, WORLD TRIBUNE
(Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.worldtribune.com/2012/04/15/german-firm-soldsurveillance-equipment-to-syria/ (detailing the relationship between Germany and
Syria in terms of arms supplies and Trovicor’s contract with Assad).
62. See Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7 (referring to a report by public
broadcaster ARD, which states that Trovicor’s parent businesses signed a contract
with a state-owned Syrian telecommunications company, STE); Andre Master,
Siemens and Syria: What Surveillance Technology Can, NETZPOLITIK, (Apr.
11, 2012, 1:26 PM), https://netzpolitik.org/2012/siemens-und-syrien-was-dieuberwachungstechnik-kann/ (claiming that the initial contract signed between
Siemens and Syria, which was eventually transferred to Trovicor, was designed to
serve a law enforcement purpose); Vernon Silver, Merchants of Surveillance,
TREASURY & RISK (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/2011/
12/22/merchants-of-surveillance (reporting that Trovicor’s marketing director,
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other contracts negotiated by Trovicor, this contract likely contained
both sale and maintenance provisions.63 Agreements of this kind,
which allow one state’s agents to operate in another state, have been
used to meet the ECtHR’s invitation requirement in the past.64
Moreover, Trovicor’s provision of law enforcement surveillance
technologies and maintenance services signal that Trovicor fulfilled a
public powers role within Syria.65 The ECtHR most recently used a
hybrid test that linked the state agent and effective control exceptions
together, finding that attempts to secure the public order are a necessary
part of the public power function because they help the rest of a
government to function.66 On the other hand, less necessary functions
like providing supplemental education services are not considered
enough to fulfill this exception.67 Even though many in the international
community recognize Assad’s attempts to violently suppress a
legitimate opposition, Assad has continuously claimed that surveillance
measures are necessary to stop the terrorist actions of opposing forces,
invoking concerns about national security and public order.68 Therefore,
Fischer-Harrow, refuses to release more information related to its contracts).
63. See Vernon Silver & Ben Elgin, Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine With
Help From Nokia Siemens, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/torture-in-bahrain-becomes-routinewith-help-from-nokia-siemens-networking.html (documenting that Trovicor signed
a service and maintenance contract with Bahrain).
64. See, e.g., Gentilhomme v. France, App. Nos. 48205/99, 48207/99 and
48209/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002) (describing that the ECtHR found jurisdiction
when the Algerian Government signed an agreement allowing a French agency to
operate schools on Algerian territory).
65. See Trovicor in Brief, TROVICOR, http://trovicor.com/en/company-en.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (explaining that Trovicor provides monitoring and
intelligence services that are used for the purposes of enhancing the work of law
enforcement).
66. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep.
18 ¶¶ 144–49 (2011) (determining that the UK fulfilled the public powers
exception when the Coalitional Provisional Authority declared that the British
military would provide for security and administration of Iraq, therefore the Court
found the UK’s control over its troops to be a controlling fact).
67. See Gentilhomme, Eur. Ct. H.R. (holding that the Article 8 evidence was
inadmissible).
68. See Alan Cowell, Syria Orders More Airstrikes and Calls French
Recognition of Rebels ‘Immoral’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/syria-war-developments.
html?pagewanted=all (pointing out that, at the time that this article was written, the
six Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and France had gone as far as
recognizing the Syrian opposition coalition as the legitimate government of Syria,
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the security function of Trovicor’s surveillance technology, by helping
to control the population, indicates its use for a public powers function.
Alternatively, in certain instances, under the personal model of
jurisdiction, the ECtHR has ruled that the relationship between the state
and the private party determines jurisdiction rather than the relationship
between the state and the foreign territory.69 The ECtHR imposes
liability if the state is in a position to change the behavior of the private
party.70 Thus, the ECtHR may hold Germany liable because it has
domestic control over Trovicor and a result of failing to effectively
regulate the company is that Trovicor operates unlawfully within
Syria.71 Consequently, not only is Trovicor likely considered a state
agent that serves the public power function of providing law
enforcement and national security support in Syria, but other innovative
legal tests can also be applied by the Court to find jurisdiction.

B. GERMANY IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT TROVICOR FROM
COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ABROAD BECAUSE THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS CREATES A POSITIVE
OBLIGATION
Germany’s positive obligation to protect the rights guaranteed by
the ECHR requires it to control the activities of Trovicor because a
while the United States saw it as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people
but had not officially recognized it as the government in exile); see, e.g., Syrian
President Tells Envoy Support of ‘Terrorists’ Must Stop, CNN (Oct. 21, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/21/world/meast/syria-brahimi-assad-meeting/index.
html (recounting Assad’s plea to a UN-Arab League envoy for countries to stop
providing arms and other support to the rebel terrorists within his country). But see
Mohammed Abbas & Alessandra Prentice, UK Needs More Details Before Any
Recognition of Syria Opposition, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 2012, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-syria-crisis-opposition-britain-id
USBRE8AF0G220121116 (indicating that, at the time this article was written, the
UK had delayed official recognition of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, which was
formed in November 2012 in Doha, until more information about the group could
be gathered).
69. See, e.g., Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 ¶ 71
(2004) (focusing on the level of authority and control a state exercised through its
agents operating in another state).
70. See id. (stressing that a state with control over one of its agents operating
abroad may be held accountable for violations of the ECHR committed by that
agent).
71. See id. (recognizing that liability can be incurred whether or not the state’s
agent is operating in the foreign territory lawfully or unlawfully).

2013]

GERMANY’S SUPPORT OF ASSAD

1375

sufficient nexus exists between Germany and the human rights
abuses in Syria.72 Thus far, despite these violations of human rights
in Syria, Germany has failed to take reasonable measures to prevent
Trovicor’s complicity in the invasion of privacy rights, thereby
violating its responsibilities under the ECHR.73
1. Germany Has a Positive Obligation Under Article 8 to Prevent
Trovicor from Selling Surveillance Technologies to Syria Because a
Sufficient Nexus Exists Between Germany and the Violations of
Privacy
If there is a sufficient nexus between Germany and the
surveillance occurring in Syria, Article 8 of the ECHR indicates that
Germany has a positive obligation to take reasonable measures to
prevent Trovicor from committing human rights abuses.74 This nexus
helps identify whether Germany could have reasonably been
expected to take measures to stop the invasions of privacy of Syrian
citizens.75 The complex issue of whether a nexus exists, thereby
72. See Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7 (underscoring the link
between Germany’s failed regulatory efforts and Syria’s use of torture against
those members of the opposition it identifies using Trovicor’s technology).
73. Cf. Cindy Cohn & Jillian C. York, “Know Your Customer” Standards for
Sales of Surveillance Equipment, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/it’s-time-know-your-customer-standardssales-surveillance-equipment (providing an example of a reasonable measure to
prevent export of sensitive dual-use technologies to repressive regimes that calls
for a company to avoid selling their products to customers who, following a
reasonable investigation to reveal evidence or raise concerns, the company thinks
will use those products to violate human rights).
74. See AUGENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 6 (observing that under the ‘protect,
respect, and remedy’ framework, when a corporation is close to or owned by a
state, or the corporation acts as an agent of the state, the state is liable for the
wrongful foreign acts of the corporation); see also Rotaru v. Romania, App. No.
28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 41–44 (2000) (upholding a violation of Article 8 when
private information is subject to secret surveillance by a government and
determining that the Romanian Government failed to take measures to provide
effective safeguards against the Romanian Intelligence Services’ ability to retrieve
this information).
75. See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note
46, Annexes 6–7 (suggesting that the legal relationship, when the actions of a
corporation are attributable to a state, can determine whether the state is expected
to act and whether there was a breakdown in governance); cf. Fadeyeva v. Russia,
2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶¶ 89–92 (2005) (recounting when the ECtHR
determined that Russia was expected to take reasonable measures to prevent
environmental pollution by a steel plant that had previously been owned by the
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creating a duty to prevent the actions of the corporation, necessitates
that the ECtHR look to certain factors, such as Germany’s control
over Trovicor, Germany’s actual or constructive knowledge of
Trovicor’s activities, and Trovicor’s level of responsibility for
Syria’s human rights violations.76
Although Trovicor is not owned or operated by Germany, the facts
that it is headquartered in Munich and that the German Bundestag
regulates it indicate that Germany does exercise significant control
over the company.77 Trovicor was established in 2009 and was
founded as a subsidiary of Siemens, a company incorporated in
Germany and subject to German regulation.78 Siemens began selling
surveillance technologies to Syria in 2000 and this practice continued
once Trovicor was officially established.79 Furthermore, not only
does Germany have the ability to regulate the data protection
industry, it actively does so through regulations of the exportation of
dual-use surveillance technologies.80 Similar to Fadeyeva, where
Russia was held liable for a Russian regulated steel plant’s violations
of Article 8, Germany has enough control over Trovicor to imply a
state and over which Russia continued to exercise control).
76. See Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶¶ 89–90 (concentrating on
issues of the control Russia had over a steel factory and the responsibility it bore in
environmental cases); Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
210 ¶¶ 57–60 (1998) (concentrating on the knowledge, possessed by the
government, of the dangers a town faced from factory emissions that the
government did not pass on to the affected population).
77. See Trovicor in Brief, supra note 65 (evidencing that Trovicor’s website
lists the location of its headquarters as Munich); cf. Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights, supra note 46, Annex 7 (proposing that an effective way to
remedy the governance gap when a corporation is headquartered in a specific state
is to place responsibility on the state to guarantee that the corporation respects
human rights abroad).
78. SIEMENS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 51, at 25 (listing which acts of
the German Bundestag regulate Siemens AG, the parent corporation of Trovicor);
Company Overview of Trovicor GmbH, supra note 46.
79. See Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7 (describing how the spin-off
company, Trovicor, took over the Voice and Data Recording unit of Nokia
Siemens).
80. See Legislation (Non-Official Translations), FED. OFFICE OF ECON. & EXP.
CONTROL, http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/legislation/index.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2013) (providing links to each of the six major pieces of legislation
passed by the Bundestag on the subject of export controls); Knight, supra note 42
(referencing new initiatives being put forth by the Left Party and Green Party in
Germany to crack down on exportation of dual-use software to totalitarian states).
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positive duty by Germany to take reasonable measures to prevent the
human rights violations.81
Furthermore, Germany’s awareness of Trovicor’s human rights
violations reveals that a sufficient nexus exists between Germany
and the intrusions into the privacy of Syrian citizens, indicating that
Germany not only had constructive knowledge, but also actual
knowledge of Trovicor’s activities.82 Trovicor, through Siemens, has
been selling technology to Syria since 2000.83 A member of the
German Bundestag has even spoken out against the original contract
signed with Syria, evidencing actual knowledge within the German
government of the situation in Syria.84 Furthermore, these human
rights violations are not just limited to Syria: Trovicor sold similar
surveillance technologies to other authoritarian regimes, including
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia.85 This pattern of sales by Trovicor
signals that Germany has, at the very least, constructive knowledge
of Trovicor’s actions, especially as compared to other instances
where the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 through constructive
and actual knowledge.86
81. See Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 91 (holding Russia responsible
for the environmental violations of private life by the Severstal steel plant because
Russia exercised control over the plant but failed to prevent or reduce the pollution
that it produced); see also Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210 ¶¶ 57, 60 (holding
Italy responsible for failing to control the activities of a factory that allowed waste
to pollute the Manfredonia area, because the government possessed knowledge of
the danger posed by pollution from the plant, but never acted to protect the people
of Manfredonia or inform them of the danger).
82. See Knight, supra note 42 (reporting that German media had previously
revealed the role of companies like Trovicor in the sale of malware to Syria).
83. Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7.
84. See Mit Thomas Kausch, Syria Monitors with Siemens Technology, FAKT
(Apr. 10, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.mdr.de/fakt/siemens106.html (indicating
that Hans-Christian Ströbele declared that the German firms that sold surveillance
technology to the Syrian regime, known for torturing regime opponents, were
complicit in the regime’s crimes).
85. See Trevor Timm, Spy Tech Companies & Their Authoritarian Customers,
Part II: Trovicor and Area SpA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-tech-companies-their-authoritariancustomers-part-ii-trovicor-and-area-spa (showing that even after another German
entity, Perusa Partners Fund, purchased Trovicor, the company has continued to
help dictators in the Middle East and North Africa crack down on their citizens).
86. See, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 296 (2002) (finding
a violation of Article 8 because Turkey knew the private lives of Greek Cypriots
were being harmed and failed to alter its policy toward Cyprus).
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Germany’s knowledge of the situation is made even more apparent
given the reactions of the EU and Germany itself.87 The ECtHR has
found positive obligations to prevent violations of the ECHR when
public authorities are aware or have knowledge of the continuing
violations, even if the public authorities have taken steps to improve
the situations.88 In this instance, members of the German Bundestag
have publicly spoken out against the privacy violations in states to
which Trovicor has exported its technologies.89 Moreover, European
countries and the broader European Parliament have responded by
creating stricter export controls for dual-use technologies, such as
those exported by Trovicor, and urged member states of the EU to
take corrective measures to prevent surveillance technologies from
reaching authoritarian regimes.90 Thus, Germany had knowledge of
both Trovicor’s activities in Syria and the severity of human rights
violations occurring in Syria, putting Germany in a position to
prevent the exportation of these dual-use goods in the first place.
Furthermore, the nature and extent of the human rights abuses, in
which Trovicor was complicit, speaks to the nature of the positive

87. See Knight, supra note 42 (illustrating the political climate and how
minority parties in the Bundestag have called for increased pressure against
companies like Trovicor); Valentina Pop, EU Companies Banned from Selling
Spyware to Repressive Regimes, EU OBSERVER (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:12 PM),
http://euobserver.com/cyber/113791 (describing the negative response from NGOs
and the media to dual-use technology being exported to repressive regimes and
explaining the European Parliament’s desire to be more pro-active in preventing
this technology from being spread in the first place).
88. See, e.g., Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
257 ¶ 89 (2005) (deciding that Russia had a duty to prevent the environmental
pollution of a steel plant because the pollution violated the right to a private life
and the degraded quality of the environment was both long-standing and well
known).
89. See Tom Burghardt, Torture Island: Where Offshore Meets the National
Surveillance State, DISSIDENT VOICE (Sept. 5, 2011), http://dissidentvoice.org/
2011/09/torture-island-where-offshore-meets-the-national-surveillance-state/
(drawing attention to comments by a spokesman for the association of federal
criminal investigators in Germany who commented on the corruption within
Siemens, which allowed Trovicor’s technologies to be exported).
90. See Cindy Cohn, EU Parliament Takes the First Step to Prevent Sales of
Surveillance Equipment Used to Violate Human Rights, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Oct. 6, 2011) (discussing the passage of an EU resolution in 2011 that bans the
sale of surveillance technology that is then used to violate either human rights or
democratic principles).
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obligation established and the scope of German responsibility.91 While
the ECtHR typically provides a margin of appreciation, similar to the
judicial standard of reasonable deference, towards the decisionmaking of national authorities, the severity of the intrusions on privacy
and the extent of Trovicor’s involvement in these human rights abuses
will greatly diminish the margin of appreciation afforded to
Germany.92 When the cause of a human rights violation can easily be
attributed to a specific corporation, the ECtHR has been willing to
hold the state in which the corporation is based responsible because a
positive obligation to prevent the violation exists.93 Thus, the ECtHR
will likely find Germany responsible for Trovicor’s actions given that
Germany had control over Trovicor, Germany knew of Trovicor’s
history of exporting its technologies to authoritarian regimes for
surveillance purposes, and Germany knew of Trovicor’s complicity in
violating the Convention in such an egregious manner.
2. Germany Is Responsible for the Violations of Information Privacy
Because Germany Failed to Fulfill Its Responsibility to Prevent
Trovicor from Committing Human Rights Abuses
Given that state authorities have actual knowledge of Trovicor’s
actions, the next step is to compare the margin of appreciation
91. See Timm, supra note 85 (shedding light on the capacity of Trovicor’s
technologies to track and locate individuals which may be allowing the Syrian
government to detain and torture its citizens as has reportedly occurred in Bahrain
and Tunisia); Frankfurt am Main, Middle East: German Technology Used Against
Democratic Movements, INT’L SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 29, 2011),
http://www.ishr.org/Detailansicht.697+M5e490bfdd7b.0.html (summarizing the
severity of the crackdowns on opposition movements like those in Syria that can
be attributed to comprehensive surveillance packages like those provided to Syria
by Trovicor).
92. See The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/
t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp (last visited Apr. 5,
2013) (noting that, given the proportionality doctrine, the margin of appreciation is
severely diminished given a high risk that a right codified in the European
Convention is being violated). See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of
Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
843, 843–47 (1999) (providing the historical development of the margin of
appreciation doctrine and explaining under which conditions the ECtHR will grant
higher levels of deference).
93. See Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶
94 (2005) (finding Russia responsible when the source of the environmental
pollution in Cherepovets was easily attributable to the Russian steel plant).
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afforded to states with the standard of effectiveness. The standard of
effectiveness is the requisite degree of protection that needs to be
afforded to remedy an ongoing human rights violation.94 After
accounting for Germany’s margin of appreciation, the ECtHR
typically looks to a fair balance between the societal interests at stake
and the burden imposed on the state to ensure protection of ECHR
rights.95
First, the ECtHR will determine the standard of effectiveness,
otherwise described as the mechanisms ultimately necessary to deter
companies such as Trovicor from engaging in agreements to provide
their technologies to repressive governments such as Syria.96 In this
regard, ECtHR judges are afforded the benefit of hindsight.97 While
German law provides the opportunity for the Bundestag to pass
legislation requiring reporting of exports in order to affect political
interests and the fulfillment of legal obligations, these laws have
failed to implement clear criminal law provisions for committing
human rights violations abroad.98 In this instance, the standard of
94. See DIMITRIS XENOS, THE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 118 (2012) (defining the standard
of effectiveness as an attempt to achieve an end and a complete resolution to the
human rights abuse).
95. See López-Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶¶ 51–58 (1994) (determining that despite the state’s margin of appreciation,
specifically to promote a positive economic impact, the pollution and nuisance
created by the waste-management plant negatively affected the community
interests so much that a fair balance was not met between the competing interests);
MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 19 (listing factors the Court has considered in
determining the “fair balance,” including: “the importance of the public interest at
stake and the state’s margin of appreciation, the rule of law and the practice of the
state parties with regard to the question at issue . . . the importance of the right at
issue, the requirement to protect the rights of third parties, etc.”).
96. See López-Ostra, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 46–47, 58 (finding that
the municipality’s partial shutdown of the plant was not sufficient to cure the third
party’s violation of Article 8 because the state was required to guarantee a
complete end to the violations); XENOS, supra note 94, at 106 (identifying that the
ECtHR looks to the minimum scope of protection by adding up the different
measures necessary to prevent the violation of the rights).
97. XENOS, supra note 94, at 118 (noting that judges may review comparative
examples of past actions by member states or resolutions to aid their
determinations).
98. See Außenwirtschaftsgesetz [AWG] [Foreign Trade Act], May 27, 2009,
BGBL. I at 1150, §26 (Ger.) (laying out the reporting requirements for dual-use
exports and the potential civil liability arising therefrom); Export Control, FED.
OFFICE OF ECON. & EXP. CONTROL, http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/
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effectiveness is relatively high since Germany’s control over
Trovicor in this situation does not concern a direct extraterritorial
action but a domestic action with extraterritorial effect.99 The ECtHR
recognizes that in certain contexts criminal law provisions are
necessary to prevent a third party from violating an individual’s right
to a private life, despite the wide margin of appreciation afforded to
the state.100 The ECtHR’s success depends on criminal laws’ ability
to create an effective deterrent and prevent future violations of
ECHR rights.101 Because Trovicor’s technology intrudes into
individuals’ private lives and leads to detentions, tortures, and
disappearances, its technology violates the dignity of individuals;
thus, the ECtHR will likely find that by not using criminal law
provisions or preventing Trovicor from exporting dual-use
technologies, Germany failed both to create an effective deterrent
and to bridge the governance gap.102
Moreover, the ECtHR is likely to identify other effective methods
Germany could have employed to curtail Trovicor from propping up
the Assad regime, in order to demonstrate whether the margin of
index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (recognizing the need to regulate export
control technology through the Foreign Trade Act in order to prevent human rights
violations). But see STEPHAN MÜLLER, OPPENHOFF & PARTNER, EXPORT
CONTROL: GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ADOPTS AMENDMENT OF THE
FOREIGN TRADE ACT (on file with publication) (commenting that the 2012
amendments to the Foreign Trade Act downgraded many criminal offenses to
simple regulatory offenses and imposed higher standards on what could constitute
a criminal offense).
99. See AUGENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 43 (discussing that the ECtHR
acknowledged a distinction between the two types of extraterritorial actions in
Bankovic, and that the ECtHR holds domestic actions with an extraterritorial effect
to a different standard).
100. See X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No/ 8978/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 24–27
(1985), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157603 (finding that the civil law did not adequately protect a sexually-abused,
mentally handicapped minor, nor did it afford her the right to enjoy a private life).
101. Id. But see Rainer Buergin, Germany Eases Rules for Dual-Use Exports,
Ministry Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-08-15/germany-eases-rules-for-dual-use-goods-exports-ministry-says
.html (showing that Germany makes the exportation of dual-use weapons a
criminal offense because of the dangerous nature of the weapons and the need to
deter the exportation of those arms through criminal embargoes).
102. But see Export Control, supra note 98 (indicating that Germany is moving
in the opposite direction by relaxing restrictions so that only reckless infringement
of embargoes on weapons can be criminalized).
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appreciation is wide enough to cover Germany’s actions.103 The
ECtHR looks to the standard of effectiveness, evaluating both the
potential risk to individuals and determining available practical
measures.104 The potential risk is broad because a large number of
people in foreign countries could be put under surveillance by their
government’s use of German technology.105 Moreover, the
sophistication of surveillance technologies, which include deep
packet inspection technologies that are extremely intrusive,
magnifies risk thereby providing the highest harm to individual
dignity.106 Because the potential risk to individuals is so broad, any
practical solution needs to start at the source of the problem.107 While
states are afforded a wide margin of appreciation in respect to Article
8, the ECtHR likely will find that Germany could have taken
reasonably necessary measures to protect an individual’s right to
privacy.108
103. See discussion infra Part IV.A (conveying that a know-your-customer
standard is a relatively effective method that Germany could have adopted).
104. See XENOS, supra note 94, at 109–10 (using the decision in Oneryildiz v.
Turkey, an Article 2 case, to show that the ECtHR first utilized the standard of
effectiveness doctrine to determine whether a state failed to fulfill its positive
obligation).
105. See Herman Zschiegner, The Surveillance Market and Its Victims,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/datavisualization/wired-for-repression/ (providing a visual representation that shows
that the citizens of Syria, Iran, Bahrain, and Tunisia have already been put at risk
by Germany’s technology, which is produced by multiple German surveillance
firms); see also Jennifer Barker, EU Parliament Urges Tough Rules for
Surveillance
Tech
Exporters,
TECHWORLD
(Oct.
24,
2012),
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/440003/eu_parliament_urges_tough_rules_
surveillance_tech_exporters/ (noting that other repressive states seek sophisticated
European surveillance technologies to spy on their citizens, including states like
Iran, Ethiopia, Sudan, China, Burma, and Cuba).
106. See Fuchs, supra note 47, at 31–32 (documenting the impact of Trovicor’s
deep packet inspection which can record data related to any target, including his or
her location, and communications like instant messages and phone conversations).
107. See MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 186–87 (acknowledging that positive
obligations often require procedural policy changes by a state in order to
effectively remedy the violation); XENOS, supra note 94, at 116–18 (detailing
practical protection mechanisms found by the ECtHR and explaining that these
protections must meet a standard of effectiveness to remedy the current violation
and future violations).
108. See López-Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶ 55 (1994) (recognizing that positive obligations diminish the margin of
appreciation and require states to take reasonably necessary measures to secure
those obligations); JEAN-FRANCOIS AKANDJI-KOMBE, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
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The fair balance test sheds light on whether the state correctly
assessed its need to take action given the standard of effectiveness
and whether a state is obliged to secure an ECHR-protected right
through a positive obligation.109 The interests for Germany in
allowing Trovicor to continue its exportation of surveillance
technology without extra restrictions include avoiding the costs to
secure monitoring of exports and promoting economic growth from
those exports.110 The public costs to monitor exports and to
effectively administer stricter export laws are very expensive,
procedural endeavors.111 Generally, the ECtHR has not shown
reluctance in requiring states to institute procedural safeguards, such
as information gathering, to guarantee that ECHR rights are not
violated.112
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (2007),

available
at
http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/1B521F61-A636-43F5-AD565F26D46A4F55/0/DG2ENHRHAND072007.pdf (explaining that clear limits exist
to a state’s margin of appreciation in the context of Article 8 rights); Guerra v.
Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210 ¶¶ 59–60 (1998) (indicating
that if a state were to provide information to the population about the threat to their
dignity, then the ECtHR would recognize that the state attempted to mitigate the
harm).
109. See MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 186–87 (summarizing that the ECtHR has
refused to find positive obligations for social facilities and welfare benefits); see
also Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 46, Annex 11
(noting that one of the biggest challenges posed by the governance gap is the need
for states to effectively balance the social benefits of business growth with the
need for human rights protection).
110. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, SURVEILLANCE OF INTRA-EURO-AREA
COMPETITIVENESS AND IMBALANCES 56 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-1_en.pdf
(indicating that much of German economic growth derives from external exports
and the ability to stay competitive despite the increasing supply of cheap goods
from Asia); U.N. DEV. PROGRAM SOUTH EASTERN & EASTERN EUR.
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE CONTROL OF SMALL ARMS & LIGHT WEAPONS,
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES 18–19 (2011), available at
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/research/armaments/
transfers/publications/other_publ/other%20publications/Internal%20Compliance%
20Programmes.pdf (reciting the administrative monitoring required by Germany to
implement the Foreign Trade Law, with regards to export licensing, certification,
and other mandatory compliance measures).
111. See Buergin, supra note 101 (reporting German intentions to relax
restrictions on dual-use exports in order to promote German competitiveness
abroad).
112. See XENOS, supra note 94, at 115–16 (discussing that the ECtHR often
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Lax export control laws directly increase Germany’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) by adding positive value to its balance of
payments;113 however, the economic benefit in question only relates
to export of dual-use surveillance technologies, which shows a
marginal value of lax controls of these particular exports.114 The
other major source of economic gain is encouraging growth and
innovation in dual-use goods sectors by broadening the consumer
market to foreign states, thereby increasing demand.115 While the
surveillance sector in Germany produces high returns, the market is
already flooded with fifteen larger companies, indicating that there
might not be much opportunity for small and medium-size
surveillance firms to grow.116
The societal interests at stake, however, are much greater than the
marginal economic benefits that Germany could derive from laxer
dual-use export laws.117 This is true because when weighing these
competing interests, the ECtHR has typically not allowed purely
economic concerns to justify the intrusion into ECHR protected
rights.118 Even if the ECtHR imposes a heavy financial burden on the
requires administrative safeguards to be implemented at both a general and a
specific level).
113. See generally Paul Krugman, European Crisis Realities, N.Y. TIMES
KRUGMAN OPINION PAGES BLOG (Feb. 25, 2012, 7:01 AM),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/european-crisis-realities/ (showing
the integral role that exports played in the development of German competitiveness
and the increase in GDP despite the growing European economic crisis).
114. See IAN DAVIS, THE REGULATION OF ARMS AND DUAL-USE EXPORTS:
GERMANY, SWEDEN, AND THE UK 19–22 (2002) (pointing out that export controls
on surveillance, which is a subset of regulations on military trade, is merely one
tool used in the vast arsenal of trade restrictions and regulations).
115. See id. at 161–62, 262 (highlighting that Germany has innovative tracking
systems, and that increases in overall sales of dual-use exports translates to higher
employment by companies in the exporting state).
116. See Jean Marc Manach, Spyfiles: Revelations of a Billion-Dollar Mass
Surveillance Industry, OWNI.EU (Dec. 1, 2011), http://owni.eu/2011/12/01/spyfileswikileaks-revelations-of-mass-internet-surveillance/ (portraying the saturation of
the surveillance export market with over 133 companies exporting such
technologies, fifteen of which were located in Germany).
117. See Fuchs, supra note 47, at 32 (detailing the intrusiveness of Trovicor’s
technologies and the repression that causes violations to individuals’ dignity).
118. See López-Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶ 55 (1994) (finding the detriment to the enjoyment of private life caused by
pollution from a waste treatment plant to outweigh the economic gain that the state
received from the functioning of the plant); XENOS, supra note 94, at 103 (arguing
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state, it tends to give preference to severe deprivation of rights over
economic gains.119 Similar to cases already heard by the ECtHR, the
Syrian Electronic Army consistently violates Article 8 rights—the
rights to a private life and correspondence—through the collection of
private information, the interception of correspondence, and the
storage of private information.120 Due to the immediacy and
seriousness of the violations, which include the unlawful interference
with private lives and more serious violations directly resulting from
Trovicor’s technologies, the ECtHR will likely determine that the
societal interests at stake are quite grave.121
Moreover, much harm is done to the European community when
entities discredit ECHR rights, because this creates a perception that
rights can be violated without adequate justification, thereby
increasing the chances of rights violations in the future.122
that the pressing social need of extreme rights violations outweighs the potential
economic benefits that a state stands to gain).
119. See Ledyaeva v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 9-10 (2006) (holding that the
economic benefit of the steel plant was not sufficient to justify a nearly complete
deprivation to the right to enjoy private life); Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No.
55723/00, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 101 (2005) (finding a violation of Article 8,
despite recognizing that economic benefit of the steel plant to the Vologda area is
explicitly considered a legitimate basis under Article 8(2) of the ECHR); XENOS,
supra note 94, at 103 (comparing social costs to economic benefits).
120. See Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 62–63 (2000)
(holding that the collection and storage of private information was grounds for a
violation under Article 8); Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 80 (1984) (“[A]s far as interception of communications is
concerned, the interferences with the applicant’s right under Article 8 (art. 8) to
respect for his private life and correspondence . . . were not ‘in accordance with the
law.’”).
121. See Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 3124 ¶¶ 113–16 (1998) (explaining that seriousness and immediacy of the
rights violations directly affects the outcome of the fair balance test); Anita
McNaught, The Business of Detention in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/20128184129588523.html
(providing evidence of how surveillance strategies have been directly linked to
detention and torture in the city of al-Bab, Syria); cf. BEN WAGNER, EXPORTING
CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 9, 10, 12, 15 (2012) (documenting
the human rights violations in Tunisia created by the use of similar surveillance
technologies, such as violations of the freedom of expression and freedom of the
press, as well as disappearances that occurred in Egypt).
122. See Sarah Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial
Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the European Convention, 20
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1223, 1224–26 (2009) (illustrating the reputational harm for the
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Unfortunately, Germany has failed to take the necessary measures to
end Trovicor’s violations of human rights.123 Accordingly, the
ECtHR will likely determine that Germany is not afforded a wide
margin of appreciation in this instance and that the fair balance test
indicates Germany violated the ECHR by failing to take action to
place necessary regulations on dual-export surveillance technologies.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to having the European Court of Human Rights decide
a case related to the human rights violations facilitated by Trovicor,
other actions could be taken to prevent future commission of such
human rights abuses. These solutions would require much
international cooperation, but should be implemented as soon as
possible to increase protection and prevent other rights violations
from occurring in the interim. Broader approaches include
strengthening the Global Network Initiative (GNI) or implementing
stronger human rights protections through the World Trade
Organization (WTO), while a narrower approach might require
individual states, such as Germany, to change their export laws.

A. THE GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE MODEL SHOULD BE
ADOPTED WITH MORE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
A coalition of ICT-related companies started the GNI to protect
Internet freedom and prevent violations of privacy through the
voluntary commitment of individual companies.124 The GNI has not
legitimacy of human rights and of the ECHR when perceived rights violations,
even if they are in a foreign territory, go unaddressed).
123. See Moritz Jaeger, Germany Proposes Ban on Surveillance Software
Exports to Totalitarian Regimes, ZDNET (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:05 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/germany-proposes-ban-on-surveillance-software-exports-tototalitarian-regimes-7000004379/ (reporting that Germany has called for the EU to
reform its dual-use export policies instead of taking action on a domestic level);
David Meyer, EU Moves to Stop Surveillance Tech Sales to Despots, ZDNET (Dec.
8, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/eu-moves-to-stop-surveillance-techsales-to-despots-3040094614/ (indicating that the EU has recognized the leakage
of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes and has called for all parties
involved to take responsibility for this phenomenon).
124. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE NETH., GLOBAL CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 5 (2011), available at
http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/minbuza/en/the_ministry/globalcorporate-responsibility---freedom-online.pdf (stating that companies like Google,
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been effective, however, because even though major information and
communication technology firms have signed onto the voluntary
agreement that promotes corporate social responsibility, many other
businesses have refused to become members.125 Furthermore, even
corporations that have signed onto the agreement have failed to
create a meaningful change in their decision-making by taking active
measures to prevent their technology from falling into the hands of
repressive governments.126
Instead, states should implement the GNI’s model with more
effective enforcement, to actually change the behavior of companies
and remedy the concerns of a governance gap.127 The Council of
Europe and the EU have already made efforts to address these
corporate abuses by recognizing that it is in the best interest of
Europe to place universal human rights above these corporate
interests.128 The United Nations (UN) has already stated that
businesses should be held to a higher standard of corporate social
responsibility to guarantee that fundamental rights are not violated.129

Microsoft, Yahoo!, Evoca, and Folksam started GNI in order to protect free
expression and privacy).
125. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Sites Like Twitter Absent From Free Speech Pact,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/technology/
07rights.html?_r=0 (reporting that three years after the launch of GNI, many
important players have still refused to sign onto the voluntary pact).
126. See Jillian C. York, Government Internet Surveillance Starts With
Eyes Built in the West, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 2, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/09/government-internet-surveillance-startseyes-built (noting Hillary Clinton’s support of the GNI because it establishes a
responsibility mechanism for corporations).
127. See Eva Galperin & Rebecca Bowe, Global Network Initiative Gets an
Inside Look at Tech Firms’ Human Rights Practices, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(May 11, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/05/global-network-initiativegets-inside-look-tech-firms%E2%80%99-human-rights-practices (recording the
benefits of the GNI, such as, establishing senior oversight, communicating human
rights issues throughout the organization, and establishing formal mechanisms to
review metrics).
128. See ECCJ & AI, supra note 16, at 4 (noting that, since 2007, the Council of
Europe passed a resolution on corporate social responsibility and that the EU has
stressed the need for greater accountability on the part of corporations).
129. See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED
NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/11/04, at 14 (2011) (highlighting the special role businesses play in
society, and the importance of businesses committing to respect human rights).
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While the UN’s groundwork is helpful to further the cause, a
binding, international mechanism that punishes companies for failing
to meet the standards outlined is needed in order to effect change in a
timely manner.

B. GERMANY SHOULD ADOPT MORE STRINGENT DUAL-USE
EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS
Given that the GNI has failed to alter the behavior of corporations,
binding state laws are needed to materially affect the actions of
companies and to account for the governance gap, an option of which
has already been discussed before the German Parliament.130 In this
vein, a German policy that would force companies to affirmatively
determine for what purposes and how their customers intend to use
their products could be effective at preventing another Trovicoresque incident from occurring.131 Such a proposal could include more
stringent export control laws that specifically outlaw the sale of
surveillance technologies to Syria, to oppressive regimes generally,
or to states with overbroad police discretion.132 This approach is
necessary when voluntary approaches by companies to effectively
monitor the activities of their clientele fail.133 Under such a system,
130. See Dixie Hawtin, Internet Charters and Principles: Trends and Insights,
GLOBAL PARTNERS & ASSOCS., http://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw__internet_charters_and_principles.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (underscoring the
ineffectiveness of the Global Network Initiative because this charter is simply a
voluntary engagement by companies and fails to have any sort of implementation
mechanism); Knight, supra note 42 (elaborating on the pressure put on by the
German socialist Left Party and the Green Party, both of whom demanded real
accountability by these corporations through the creation of stricter laws to
regulate the activities and exports of companies like Trovicor).
131. See Cohn & York, supra note 73 (conveying how a know-your-customer
standard similar to the requirements laid out in the United States’ Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act could lay the foundation for effective regulation of dual-use exports).
But see Sari Horwitz & Shyamantha Asokan, U.S. Probing Use of Surveillance
Technology in Syria, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/us-probes-use-of-surveillance-technology-in-syria/
2011/11/17/gIQAS1iEVN_story.html (indicating that technology from Californiabased Blue Coat Systems might have entered Syria, thereby showing that the
know-your-customer standard of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act might not be
sufficient to curb the behavior of these companies).
132. Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. 3 2013) (describing the administrative red flag
system in the United States that helps prevent exports from getting into the wrong
hands).
133. See Cohn & York, supra note 73 (documenting the need for regulatory
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the human rights record of a country and other country-specific
factors can serve as red flags for any company seeking to export
surveillance or other dual-use technologies.134
More extreme examples of German regulation could include a
complete ban on exportation of surveillance technologies to any
authoritarian state as a proactive means to help eliminate the risk of
aiding human rights abuses.135 Any approach focused on German
legislation would efficiently remedy the problem without having to
deal with concerns about applying the European Convention
extraterritorially.136 While this comment does not provide an
exhaustive list of legislative options available to Germany, the key
takeaway is that Germany should develop more stringent export
controls that create harsher punishments on companies that facilitate
human rights abuses because Germany should seek to avoid ECHR
liability for failing to effectively regulate its exports.

C. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SHOULD ESTABLISH A
HUMAN RIGHTS−BASED EXCEPTION TO FREE TRADE TO
ENCOURAGE STRICTER EXPORT CONTROLS BY MEMBER STATES
As an organization with a larger number of member states than the
Council of Europe, the WTO is in a prime position to prevent future
rights violations that could be controlled through international
trade.137 Currently, the WTO allows states to limit trade if the traded
item could hinder the right to life, a principle found in Article 2 of
the ECHR.138 The WTO does not create trade exceptions for many
approaches given that Nokia Siemens Networks, which owned Trovicor prior to
Perusa Partners Fund, had adopted a voluntary Human Rights Policy, but clearly
failed to abide by the mandates of that policy when it decided to export these
technologies).
134. Id.
135. See Knight, supra note 42 (focusing on the potential of an EU-wide ban on
exporting dual-use technologies to any of these authoritarian states because of the
tendency of these states to use these technologies for illegitimate purposes).
136. See Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 ¶ 61 (2001).
137. See Members and Observers, WTO http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (indicating that the WTO
currently has 158 members).
138. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (1995) (listing the right to life exception to free trade); ECHR,
supra note 11, art. 2 (codifying a right to life in the ECHR).
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other kinds of rights violations, however, including the ECHR’s
Article 8 right to a private life.139
By expanding the GATT exceptions, the WTO could help a
responsible state create stricter dual-use export controls, such as a
“know-your-customer standard,” to avoid expensive litigation costs
from states that typically import these dual-use technologies.140 More
importantly, modifying the GATT exceptions would create a new
cause of action for people whose rights have been violated to file a
formal complaint in front of the WTO, or even in the exporting
states’ domestic court for failure to adhere to an international
treaty.141 These benefits could greatly enhance the reach of
extraterritorial human rights claims and create a positive incentive
for states to adopt stricter export controls.142 Thus, expanding the
GATT exceptions to include human rights not only would create an
international framework for human rights protection in trade, but
would also encourage states to adopt stricter trade standards to avoid
liability.

V. CONCLUSION
The increased export of Western surveillance technologies to
oppressive regimes, such as Assad’s regime in Syria, demonstrates
the need for stronger restrictions to prevent future violations of
universally recognized rights.143 Because of the multinational nature
139. See Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages
and Suggesting Convergence, 2 IDLO VOICES OF DEV. JURISTS PAPER SERIES 3,
12–14 (2005) (defending the implementation of human rights and social clauses in
the GATT exceptions to free trade in order to create a clear and non-arbitrary basis
for imposing sanctions).
140. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT/WTO
LEGAL SYSTEM 61 (Joel P. Trachtman ed., 1987) (identifying fear of lawsuits as a
legitimate concern for developed states and attributing the rise of pragmatism as an
attempt by these developed states to avoid WTO lawsuits lodged by developing
states).
141. See Zagel, supra note 139, at 12–13 (indicating that a human rights
exception to the GATT would increase the overall protection of human rights by
placing the burden on complainant states to show the trade restriction is not
necessary to achieve the goal of increased human rights protections).
142. See id. at 22 (recognizing that an amendment to GATT is necessary to
reach broad human rights protection, but that such protection is unlikely to occur in
the current political climate).
143. See Timm, supra note 85 (recognizing the threat posed to internet freedoms
by the increased use of surveillance technologies by repressive regimes and the

2013]

GERMANY’S SUPPORT OF ASSAD

1391

of these companies, it is difficult to hold each company responsible;
however the ECtHR offers a framework for positive obligations that
requires states to prevent human rights abuses by a corporation
before they occur. Trovicor’s actions fall within Article 1’s
jurisdiction because of the law enforcement nature of Trovicor’s
surveillance technology and the justifications given by Assad for
using such technology as a means to fight terrorists and promote
national security.144 Moreover, Germany’s failure to regulate
Trovicor’s actions constitutes a failure to fulfill the positive
obligation imposed on it under the ECHR.145 The result of such
violations is extremely important, not only because of the arbitrary
detentions, torture, and disappearances that result from the invasions
on Syrian privacy, but also because the intrusions help break down
the opposition and prolong the internecine conflict.

integral part Western technology plays in propping up these complex Syrian
surveillance systems).
144. See supra Part III.A (exploring the relationship between the concept of
preservation of public order and the development of the extraterritoriality principle
of ECHR jurisdiction).
145. See supra Part III.B (discussing the duty Germany owes to Syrians whose
right to private life is being violated and Germany’s failure to impose reasonable
restrictions on Trovicor).

